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Violent extremist groups are currently making intensive use of Internet fora for recruitment to terrorism.
These fora are under constant scrutiny by security agencies, private vigilante groups, and hackers, who
sometimes shut them down with cybernetic attacks. However, there is a lack of experimental and formal
understanding of the recruitment dynamics of online extremist fora and the effect of strategies to control
them. Here, we utilize data on ten extremist fora that we collected for four years to develop a data-driven
mathematical model that is the first attempt to measure whether (and how) these external attacks induce
extremist fora to self-regulate. The results suggest that an increase in the number of groups targeted for
attack causes an exponential increase in the cost of enforcement and an exponential decrease in its
effectiveness. Thus, a policy to occasionally attack large groups can be very efficient for limiting violent
output from these fora.
E
merging technologies that permit data collection at unprecedented scale can reveal patterns of individual
and group behavior1–5 and they have propelled the development of data-driven mathematical models of
human conflict. These include models of insurgent and terrorist activity6–10, global trends in violence across
human history11–13, cultural and ethnic confrontation14–17, and the structure and dynamics of criminal organiza-
tions18–20.
Here, we turn our attention to violent extremist groups thatmake intensive use of Internet fora for recruitment,
illegal financing, internal communication and, in fully radicalized individuals, operative support of real world
violent activity21–24. For the past decade, extremists have been using online networks to socialize their members
and to reinforce aspects of their radical culture25,26. These networks diminish the sense of isolation formembers of
extremist groups and give them access to a global community that enjoys the legal and religious approval of the
leaders of their movements27. They also facilitate the acquisition of articles, books, and audiovisual material with
radical content that are created in clandestine or underground circles. Without access to these networks, obtain-
ing material like these would be much more difficult28.
Online fora are particularly important for extremist groups, as they play a key role in the terrorist recruitment
process. These platforms have not only become a common medium for extremist organizations to spread their
propaganda and obtain funding, but they have also transformed into the primary arena where the process of
violent radicalization takes place29. Extremist fora allow users to reinforce their identities as militants through
virtual activism and help to create a hierarchy within the group that can be easily monitored by the group leaders.
In fact, it is possible to detect specific participation rules in these fora that allow users to improve their reputation
within the group and their status within the community30. Those users who achieve the highest statusmay then be
recruited to engage in real world operations21–24.
Although it is well documented that recruitment into online fora can lead to recruitment into terrorist
organizations, it is important to emphasize that these processes are not the same.We are not claiming that online
fora are a proxy for real world terrorism. Rather, we are claiming that they are an important entry point for some
people who later engage in real world acts of violent extremism, and it is therefore important to understand how
these fora operate and how we might act to reduce their effectiveness.
Several thousand websites support and promote extremist discourse, but not all have the same impact. A very
small number of sites exert a very large amount of influence because they are the only ones to directly receive
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material prepared by extremist groups31–36. On these fora one can
find ideological diatribes, interviews, and audio and video recordings
of recent acts of violence. The other sites simply repeat and amplify
the content disseminated by the most prominent extremist fora.
Extremist Internet fora operate in a hostile environment as their
growing importance has caused them to come under scrutiny in
recent years. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that the longevity
of an online community is inversely proportional to its importance in
the radical universe. Organizations dedicated to monitoring extrem-
ist groups on the web note that 80% of the top websites to emerge
between 2002 and 2004 have disappeared because they have been
unable to withstand continuous harassment by security agencies,
private groups, and hackers37,38. These attacks are designed to infilt-
rate and boycott extremist fora39 and they have also succeeded in
provoking mistrust and mutual accusations between rival groups21.
As a result, administrators are suspicious of new users who are too
active or who express a clear interest in contacting forummembers in
person. Some platforms have implemented stricter self-protection
measures such as making their entire content available only to regis-
tered users, closing admission to new members, or accepting only
new users who have been endorsed by a current one.
Actors seeking to disrupt recruitment to extremist fora face several
technical questions40–43. Which fora should be targeted for an attack?
What strategy should be used? Given that these attacks require costly
human resources to be implemented, it is important to assess the
impact of various strategies, and to do this we need data and a model
that will help us to better understand how fora react when they are
under stress. Elucidating these questions will shed light into an
important debate: Should terrorist groups be allowed to use the
Internet, or should they be banned from it44?
In order to analyze the potential impact of cybernetic attacks, we
recorded the number ofmembers registered from 10 different fora, as
reported automatically by the forum platforms (see Table 1, Table 2,
and Figure 1 for the list of forums analyzed and monitoring statist-
ics). Recordings were performed at 12 AMGMT. The data collection
started 1/1/2008 for the Forum 2, which is the earliest forum that we
were able to detect, and spanned the next 4 years for the rest of the
fora. The number of measurements per forum ranges from 7 to 49,
and the sampling rate was constrained by the availability and access-
ibility of each forum. In Table 2 we provide the details of the data
collected for each forum and overall statistics showing, among other
things, the skewness of the distribution (notice that themean number
of members is significantly larger than the median). Forum 10 is not
shown here, as it was discarded from our analysis for reasons dis-
cussed below.
The reported information was publicly accessible without login or
participation required. No further checks on the validity of these
reported figures were performed, so we cannot rule out systematic
biases introduced by the forum administrators (e.g. multiple regis-
trations by the same users, counting of inactive users, etc). During the
observation period we did not detect any deliberate efforts to stra-
tegically misrepresent the data. However, given the possibly quite
large incentives for misrepresentation, further work on the assess-
ment of data veracity is certainly needed. We also cannot rule out
problems arising from the left-censoring of our data, as we lack
information about activity prior to the detection of a forum.
Although the observation period for the 10 fora spans 4 years, we
were unable to record information on a daily basis, as we would find
the fora inaccessible on many occasions – mostly de-activated with
nowebsite connectivity. The time-span for which these fora would be
de-activated varied from days to months. Even though we may sus-
pect that the fora under study were shut down as a result of an attack,
we do not have direct evidence of this attack, and cannot establish a
causal link.
In selecting the sites for analysis, we focused attention on fora that
constituted the ‘‘inner circle’’ or core of the violent extremist pres-
ence on Internet. These fora 1) served as primary sources of dissem-
ination of propaganda produced directly by extremist organizations,
2) had users that were implicated in real-world acts of terror, and 3)
had the largest following and influence in the extremist cyber-
community31–36. In addition, we only included a particular forum if
we detected at least one instance where sharing of text or multimedia
material prepared by extremists took place during the observation
period. These fora also contained normal discussion and sharing of
non-extremist information among members.
We excluded from our analysis ‘‘secondary’’ fora that hosted rad-
ical content copied from other sites because they typically attract very
few users. This also lead us to discard one of the ten fora under study,
run from Spain prior to August 2011. During its three-month exist-
ence, it only managed to attract 13 registered users despite its more
than 7, 800 discussion topics and 10, 000 posts from other sites,
which were uploaded daily by the site administrator45.
In Figure 1 we show the rate of growth for each forum, and given
the different initial start dates we also show these curves fitted to
reduce the Euclidean distance to Forum 8, which had the most
observations. These data suggest that fora exhibit a first phase of
exponential growth followed by a saturation phase in which they
continue to grow exponentially but at a much slower rate. This con-
trasts with the constant exponential growth (with probably a very
large cutoff established by the size of the susceptible population) one
Table 1 | List of online fora analyzed. Forum names and URLs are available from the authors on request
Forum Starting recording date Last recording date Total number of days recorded
Forum 1 06/07/2008 07/03/2011 40
Forum 2 01/01/2008 02/25/2011 7
Forum 3 02/23/2010 06/23/2011 44
Forum 4 08/02/2008 07/03/2011 46
Forum 5 02/25/2011 07/03/2011 39
Forum 6 02/25/2011 07/03/2011 39
Forum 7 01/17/2009 03/23/2011 21
Forum 8 10/29/2008 07/03/2011 49
Forum 9 02/05/2011 07/03/2011 11
Table 2 | Monitoring statistics for the fora analyzed. The statistics
are calculated for the full observation period and all fora, with the
aim to give an intuition on the large variability in our ability to
collect data across different fora
Number of Fora 9
Starting recording date 1/1/2008
Final recording date 7/3/2011
Total number of days recorded 296
Min value 13
Max value 14,135
Mean value 5778.1
Median 4912
Standard deviation 4228.1
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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might expect if members were recruited and allowed to join without
restrictions (as in the classic susceptible-infected epidemiological
model46,47). Case studies suggest that extremist fora control growth
by limiting the number of participants48.
In what follows, we describe a dynamic characterization for the
evolution of one forum, and then the population dynamics of
multiple interacting fora. Our goal is to provide a plausible explana-
tion for the empirical observations and to understand the impact
of persistent disruptive attacks on the evolution of these online
communities.
Results
We start by denoting N as the total population that is susceptible to
becoming a forum member and let p1,0 be the rate of becoming a
forum member. Within the forum itself there are several levels of
status. We are interested in the number of users at each level, so let
Xi5Xi(t) be the number of activemembers at level i.We assume that
there is a process for advancement that allows users to go from one
level to another. The rate of transition between levels is given by the
transition probability matrix pi,j which denotes the probability per
unit of time of moving from level j to level i.
For simplicity, we assume the transition probability matrix can
only move upwards, hence pi,j 5 0 for j $ i. It may be the case that
some users exit the process at different points through withdrawal
(i.e. de-registration), inertia, lack of Internet access, and so on.
However, in our model, the probability of exit is absorbed into the
transition probabilities from one level to the next one, where a prob-
ability of disengagement would yield a smaller probability of trans-
ition upwards. We also assume that the number of law enforcement
and intelligence agents inhabiting these fora are much smaller than
the number of genuine members, as otherwise it would raise aware-
ness of the forum administrators and compromise their infiltration
operation.
Suppose that there are L levels within the forum. At the highest
level an individualmay become fully recruited to engage in real world
operations (O) or to become a recruiter (R). We denote O and R the
output of the model and recruiters, respectively, produced by the
forum. Recruitment is the bottleneck of the radicalization process,
as the number of recruiters determine the change rate of X, R, andO.
This is implicit in the evolution of XL, as in this equation, the mem-
bers leaving the forum at level L depend on R, not on XL.
The dynamics of the populations within a particular forum can be
written as
dX1
dt
~p1,0N{p2,1X1,
dXi
dt
~pi,i{1Xi{1{piz1,iXi,
dXL
dt
~pL,L{1XL{1{pO,RR{pR,RR,
dR
dt
~pR,RR,
dO
dt
~pO,RR,
ð1Þ
where 2# i# L – 1, and pR,R, and pO,R denote the transition rates toR
andO, respectively. In these equations we assume that the number of
recruiters is smaller than the number of members because there is a
bottleneck in the conversion from being a forum member to being a
recruiter (R) or engaging in real life terrorism (O). We also assume
that the total population is much larger than the number of users in
the forum N? X.
The model itself is a variation of a mass-action compartment
model familiar in mathematical epidemiology46,47. Conceptual sim-
plicity drives the choice of this model, though we must stress the
caveat that changes in psychological state or activity may not neces-
sarily be similar to changes in disease status.
Full observation of all the states L, O, R presents ethical, experi-
mental49,50, and legal complications51, as it requires interaction with
the Forum participants for long periods of time. Thus, we present a
simplified version of the model where we merge all the levels of the
fora into one: X 5 X1 1 X2 1 … 1 XL. Thus, we can rewrite the
previous equations as
dX
dt
~p1,0N{ pR,RzpO,Rð ÞR,
dR
dt
~pR,RR,
dO
dt
~pO,RR,
ð2Þ
The initial conditions are X(0) 5 0, R(0) 5 R0 $ 1, O(0) 5 0. The
main output of this model is dO/dt 5 pO,RR and note that we are
assuming that there is a fixed number of susceptible individuals, N,
who may become members of the forum. We also need to take into
account the fact that the success of a forum may depend on its
popularity (for example, larger fora may be able to attract more
new members). Thus, we make the assumption that p1,0 has an
Figure 1 | (TOP) Number of members participating in the 9 extremist
fora under study. Note that initially the fora grow exponentially and then
saturate growing at a exponential yet much slower rate. (BOTTOM) Fora
time shifted to match the early stages of the development of every fora and
gain visual intuition on their dynamics. In particular, we aligned the early
stages of the all fora with Forum 8, with the exception of Forum 5, which
was aligned with Forum 9 due to a similar volume of members.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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explicit dependence on the forum size as follows, p1,0(X)5 pN(X)X,
with pN(X) . 0 for X . 0.
Next, we address the possibility that as fora becomemore popular,
they are more likely to draw the attention of anti-extremist author-
ities and other agencies, and therefore may be attacked and shut
down. We can model this by assuming that, when forum population
(X) reaches a threshold h, the forum is attacked and disabled, causing
all its variables (X, R, O) to go to 0.
Forum administrators may try to balance two forces. On the one
hand, they are aware that larger fora are more likely to be attacked, so
they may try to control the number of users on the forum. On the
other, they may want to maximize membership, making X as large as
possible (i.e., just below the threshold h).
For simplicity, suppose the transition rates to become a recruiter
or terrorist are constant such that pR,R~p0Rw0 and pO,R~p0Ow0.
Assume X* is the target value. Let X(t*)5 X*, where X* is the target
control condition for the number of members of the forum. The
stationarity condition dX(t*)/dt 5 0 implies that
pN X
ð Þ~ p
0
Rzp
0
O
 
R
N X
~ : pN , ð3Þ
where R*5 R(t*). We extrapolate pN(X*) linearly inX and R, that is,
pN X, Rð Þ~
p0Rzp
0
O
N X
Rzp0N X
{Xð Þ, if Xv Xz p

N
p0N
0, otherwise
8<
: ð4Þ
where p0N is a positive constant so that pN(X, R)$ 0 for all X, R$ 0.
Note that the stationarity condition causes the transition rate per
time unit and forum participant pN to depend on both X and R.
Because control is exerted by individual recruiters we assume con-
dition (4) will be applied with a time delay t . 0. This delay is one
factor that makes it impossible for the recruiter to stay below the
targetX* indefinitely (seeMethods, section ‘‘Implications of Delayed
Control’’).
We also need to take into account that the target set by the recrui-
ters,X*, cannot be stationary over time, because the lack of attacks on
the forum raises the expectations of the target values. We model this
by a linear factor, l, that increases the target value, X* over time.
Figure 1 shows an example of the exponential growth rate of the
forum and how it tends to decrease as the number of members
increase. The equations for the controlled forum can be written as
dX
dt
~pN X t{tð Þ,R t{tð Þ,Xð Þ N{X{R{Oð ÞX{ p0Rzp0O
 
R,
dR
dt
~p0RR,
dO
dt
~p0OR,
dX
dt
~l,
ð5Þ
where pN (X, R, X*) is given as in equation (4). Note that we have
replaced N in the first equation by (N – X – R – O) because the
number of individuals susceptible of becoming forum members are
the ones that remain outside the Forum.
It can be shown analytically that this model with control displays
the double exponential behavior of the empirical data. There is fast
exponential growth when forum administrators are not exerting
control (X tð Þ~Aect{a=cwhen t< t, t. t), and slower exponential
growth (X tð Þ~Beptzq=p~BeptzX when t < t*) when they are
close to their control target, i.e. c. p (see Methods, Section ‘‘Linear
asymptotic behavior of the forum’’). Moreover, there is additional,
subtle evidence in the data that such control mechanisms exist –
notice in Figure 1 that Forum 5 breaks out of an equilibrium around
Day 1450 and becomes exponential again, suggesting that the control
mechanism was discontinued at that point.
We also derived an alternative model without control in which the
only limiting factor for growth of the forum was the size of the
populationN (seeMethods, section ‘‘Specification of themodel with-
out control’’). In other words, it is possible that the slowdown in
growth may be driven by the fact that there are fewer susceptible
individuals in the population as forum membership increases.
However, in Figure 2 we use data from Forum 8 to demonstrate that
the model with control outperforms the alternative model, even
when we let N be a free parameter of the model that we can fit. We
also show in Table 3 the values fitted to other fora in our data set, all
of which indicate that the controlled model fits considerably better
than the uncontrolled model. The parameter p0N can be easily esti-
mated from the equations that describe the initial growth of the
forum (see Methods, section ‘‘Linear asymptotic behavior of the
forum,’’ CASE 1). The parameters p0R and p
0
O can also be uniquely
estimated by the saturation process of the forum (details in Methods
section ‘‘Linear asymptotic behavior of the forum,’’ CASE 2). The rest
of the parameters are obtained by minimizing the RMSE using the
PGAPack library52. Note that the mean-field model we propose is
based on a deterministic (not stochastic) dynamical system, and
therefore it has a unique solution for a particular set of parameters.
We now extend our model of a single forum to one that includes
the interplay between several fora by linking them together in a
model of competition. Let I be the total number of individuals,
N(t) the number of individuals susceptible to entering a forum (that
is, those who have not yet entered a forum at time t), NF the total
number of fora. For simplicity let us assume that each individual can
only belong to one forum. Then,
I~N tð Þz
XNF
j~1
Xj tð ÞzRj tð ÞzOj tð Þ , ð6Þ
which means that the total number of individuals in the system is
conserved. When a particular forum j is eliminated at time t, then
N(t1)5N(t2)1Xj(t2) andXj(t1)5 0. Note that this may lead to a
potential increase in the growth of other active fora. Forum j can
reappear again (perhaps with a different name or identity) but with a
lower equilibrium point, adjusted below the level that triggered the
attack as Xj,*(t1) 5 mXj,*(t2), where m can vary in the range (0, 1).
None of the fora know a prioriwhat the threshold h5Xj(t2) value is,
and this uncertainty creates a market for competition ruled by self-
regulation. We model the reappearing time with a Poisson distri-
bution with rate of 1 event in time TR.
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Figure 2 | Fit of the model to the Forum 8 by minimizing root mean
square error (RMSE) for the model with control (solid black line) and the
uncontrolled one (solid blue). Note that even when we add an additional
parameter to the uncontrolled model (the number of susceptible
individuals, N) the model without control cannot fit the data well
(dashed line).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Wemake use of the conservation identity in equation (6) to derive
the following expressions for rates of growth in each forum i5 1, …,
NF:
dXi
dt
~pN X
i t{tð Þ,Ri t{tð Þ,Xi, Xi|
I{
XNF
j~1
Xj tð ÞzRj tð ÞzOj tð Þ 
" #
{ pRzp
0
O
 
Ri,
dRi
dt
~p0RR
i,
dOi
dt
~p0OR
i,
dXi,
dt
~li:
ð7Þ
Initially each forum has zero members, Xi(t5 0)5 0, and at least 1
recruiter, Ri(t 5 0) 5 1, and produces no violent output Oi(0) 5 0.
Note that each forum fixes their own target values Xi,*(t 5 0), with
their own estimation of the threshold starting with a uniformly ran-
dom distribution of thresholds at the beginning. Since fora are
started at random times, we initialize pN(Xi(t 2 t), Ri(t 2 t), Xi,*)
with some probability, k.
As an illustration we conduct a numerical simulation of 50 fora,
NF 5 50, depicted in Figure 3. An external agent (for example, a
counter-terrorism agency) allows fora to grow until they reach
14, 000 members (h 5 14, 000) but no forum administrator knows
this a priori. In this example, we assume that administrators apply
their control rules with a one day delay, t 5 1. When a forum is
attacked and deactivated, its membership goes back to 0, and it
reappears with an adjusted threshold that is m 5 0.99 times the
former value. We also assume that on average 20 fora can be acti-
vated in a year, that is
k 5 20/(NF 3 365 days).
The results show that fora are able to control the size of their
membership for long periods of time, which is not a trivial problem
from a distributed control point of view. Moreover, differences in
forum lifetimes are based on the heterogeneity in their different
control target thresholds, Xi,*, and the variability in the parameter
values p0N , p
0
R, and p
0
O. This effect leads to different rates of growth for
different fora, even though the fact that policymakers exert the same
pressure on all of them.
To illustrate the implications of self-regulation, we show in
Figure 4 the dependence of total output and the number of fora
disrupted as a function of the policy maker threshold, h. Notably,
total output increases nearly exponentially with the threshold, sug-
gesting that even weak control mechanisms can have a big effect on
reducing membership. However, the marginal effect of a stricter
(lower h) policy decreases dramatically as control is tightened.
Note also that the number of fora disrupted decreases exponentially
with h, suggesting that efforts to tighten control will require an
increasingly costly effort in detection and deactivation. Therefore,
the amount of extremism reduced per unit cost of control will decline
quickly with stricter policies both because of decreasing effectiveness
of the attacks as well as increasing costs of detection/deactivation of
fora.
Discussion
The model presented here reproduces the observed dynamics of
violent extremist fora. In particular, the model shows (i) an initially
steep and exponential increase in forummembers, (ii) an intermedi-
ate interval in which the number of new members continues to grow
exponentially but at a decreasing rate, and (iii) a final stabilization
period, in which the number of participants smoothly converges
(and, eventually, overshoots) a target number of members. Our ana-
lysis shows that themodel is robust to varying assumptions about the
recruitment and control process, accommodating any arbitrary
number of status ranks in these fora, and allowing for time delay
in the implementation of the access control mechanism.
Even thoughwe and other researchers lack detailed evidence about
when and how forum self-controls might be implemented, it is
known that extremist fora are the target of law enforcement organi-
zations. Our model suggests that a simple strategic reaction to these
attacks can explain dynamic changes in forummembership. A plaus-
ible explanation suggested by field-researchers is that the forum
leaders are able to ‘broadcast’ their message to the population in a
top down manner rather than across a well defined network struc-
ture, which is known to display a bursty, slow speed of diffusion via
word-of-mouth53,54. Our model can also explain oddities in the
empirical data, such as the observation that some fora stop growing
for long periods of time, and, in some cases, they suddenly start
growing after being stagnant (see Figure 1; Forum 5). This suggests
that some fora occasionally eliminate or drastically alter their self-
control mechanisms to allow for a new burst of growth.
The model also lets us test the effect of different strategies that
might be employed by law enforcement agencies. The fact that mem-
bership increases exponentially with less strict policies means that
stricter policies may be decreasingly effective at the margin.
Moreover, the number of fora that must be attacked increases expo-
nentially with stricter policies, suggesting that the costs of enforcing
stricter polices may increase exponentially. Thus, we expect a sharp
Table 3 | Parameter values of the model fitted to each individual forum by minimizing root mean square error (RMSE) for the controlled
model. For comparison, the RMSEobtained after fitting the parameters of the uncontrolledmodel is also shown for each forum. Forum5 is not
included in the table as it breaks out of an equilibrium around Day 1450 and becomes exponential again, suggesting that the control
mechanism was discontinued at that point
Forum Name RMSE control RMSE no-control p0N p
0
R p
0
O X* (t 5 0) l
Forum 1 545 1239 2.42?1028 0.002 0.0004 2275 19.58
Forum 2 97 106 3.87?1028 0.002 0.000044 4153 0.09
Forum 3 85 171 3.50?1028 0.0003 0.001 2937 12.40
Forum 4 29 271 2.75?1028 0.002 0.0008 2220 0.66
Forum 6 49 122 1.31?1028 0.005 0.0004 7430 10.38
Forum 7 73 141 8.08?1028 0.005 0.0004 7423 10.44
Forum 8 436 1398 2.66?1028 0.0002 0.0007 2330 10.83
Forum 9 48 122 1.32?1028 0.005 0.0005 7432 11.57
Parameter Mean 3.24 ? 1028 0.0026 0.0006 4525 9.49
Standard
Deviation
2.00 ? 1028 0.0020 0.0002 2480 6.37
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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decline in the effectiveness of targeting additional fora of smaller size.
As a result, we would recommend targeting policies aimed at occa-
sionally disrupting a small number of the largest groups. Resources
devoted to a stricter policy might be better used elsewhere. Our
findings therefore back Berger’s ‘‘Strategy doesn’t have to be an all-
or-nothing proposition.’’55.
An important limitation of our model is that it is just a model –
there may be other ways to explain the growth rates we observe. Our
results yield better fit than a simple growth model without control,
suggesting that the fora have recruitment procedures that control
access in order to keep the number of members below a time-
dependent threshold. But it is possible that other processes, particu-
larly those based on recruitment within social networks (rather than
random recruitment from the population) may also fit the data. We
also note that the limited size of our dataset may hinder our efforts to
validate the proposed model, but it is important to emphasize that
these data are difficult to collect due ethical, experimental, and legal
impediments tomonitoring the activity of extremist fora. Finally, one
might expect that a deliberate policy of limiting the rate of growth to
be something that would itself be discussed on a forum, but during
our observations we did not find any evidence of such discussions.
That said, if this model approximates the true underlying process,
it suggests that evenminimal efforts to target extremist foramay have
a large effect on reducing their membership and therefore their capa-
city to recruit for real world violent acts. It also suggests that much of
this effect is due to the self-control induced in the fora rather than the
direct effect of temporarily dispersing the members of a given forum.
While our original aim was to better understand extremist groups,
we note that our model might also be of use to those seeking to
understand how legitimate fora react under stress. For example, there
have been numerous recent examples of repressive regimes that seek
to thwart the use of social media to mobilize legitimate opposition
protest56,57 and in future work it would be interesting to see whether
our model can explain changes in the membership and self-control
mechanisms adopted by fora that are used in such protests.
Methods
Forum names and URLs are available from the authors on request.
Implications of delayed control. The evolution equation for X is
dX
dt
~pN X t{tð Þ,R t{tð Þð ÞN X tð Þ{ p0Rzp0O
 
R tð Þ
~
p0Rzp
0
O
X
R t{tð ÞX tð Þzp0NN X{X t{tð Þ½ X tð Þ{ p0Rzp0O
 
R tð Þ
ð8Þ
for XƒXzpN

p0N , and
dX
dt
~{ p0Rzp
0
O
 
R ð9Þ
for XwXzpN

p0N . The resulting model yields delayed control behavior that is like
steering a boat: one tends to overshoot the target values because the action is
implemented with a delay.
Since the smaller t the better the control, we will consider the condition expressed
in equation (8). The target value X* would be reached at time t* by the uncontrolled
system. At this point,
R t{tð Þ~R{t dR
dt
tð ÞzO t2 
~ 1{tp0R
 
RzO t2
  ð10Þ
by (5), and
X{X t{tð Þ~t dX
dt
tð ÞzO t2 
~tpNN X
{t p0Rzp
0
O
 
RzO t2
 
~t p0Rzp
0
O
 
R{t p0Rzp
0
O
 
RzO t2
 
~O t2
 
ð11Þ
by equation (2) and equation (3). It follows from equation (8) that up to O(t2),
dX
dt
tð Þ~ p0Rzp0O
 
1{tp0R
 
R{ p0Rzp
0
O
 
RzO t2
 
~{t p0Rzp
0
O
 
p0RR
zO t2
 
:
The fact that dX(t*)/dt, 0 for t. 0 sufficiently small, shows that X(t) exceeds X*
before the time t 5 t* (since X t{tð Þ^X{t dX
dt
tð ÞwX).
Linear asymptotic behavior of the forum. Let us linearize at the early stages of the
formation of the forums and at later stages when forum membership reaches a high
number. We know from Eq. (5) that
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
days
10
100
1000
10000
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 m
em
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Figure 3 | Simulated number of members of 25 randomly chosen fora out of 50 during a period of 10 years: I5 17,000,000, Nf5 50 p0N~3:24e{8,
pR 5 0.0026, p0O~0:0006, h 5 14, 000, and t 5 1 day, and l 5 9.49.
Figure 4 | Total output and number of forum disruptions versus the
policymaker threshold h (lower values indicate stricter policies) using the
same set of parameters as in Figure 3.
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R tð Þ~R0ep0Rt
Replacing this in Eq. (8), we get
dX
dt
tð Þ~ p
0
Rzp
0
O
X
R0e
p0R t{tð ÞX tð Þzp0NN X{X t{tð Þ½ X tð Þ{ p0Rzp0O
 
R0e
p0Rt : ð12Þ
This equation is nonlinear due to the second term on the right hand side. With this
equation we can now study two limiting cases.
CASE 1. If t< t, t. t, then wemay replaceX*2X(t2 t) byX* in (12) sinceX(t2 t)
= X*. Eq. (12) becomes linear:
dX
dt
tð Þ{P tð ÞX tð Þ~Q tð Þ, ð13Þ
where
P tð Þ~ p
0
Rzp
0
O
X
R0e
p0R t{tð Þzp0NN X

<p0NN X
~ : cw0,
ð14Þ
because ep
0
R t{tð Þ<1 and R0/X*= 1, and
Q tð Þ~{ p0Rzp0O
 
R0e
p0Rt
<{ p0Rzp
0
O
 
R0~ :{a aw0ð Þ:
Hence
X tð Þ~Aect{ ac :
CASE 2. If t< t*, thenX*2X(t2 t)< 0 according to Eq. (11). Eq. (12) becomes also
linear, see Eq. (13), but now
P tð Þ~ p
0
Rzp
0
O
X
R0e
p0R t
{tð Þ
<
p0Rzp
0
O
X
R0e
p0Rt

~ : pw0,
Q tð Þ~{ p0Rzp0O
 
R0e
p0Rt
<{ p0Rzp
0
O
 
R0e
p0Rt

~ :{q~{pX:
ð15Þ
Analogously to Case 1, the solution is
X tð Þ~Beptz q
p
~BeptzX:
This shows that the population dynamics model is consistent wit the double expo-
nentials observed in the data.Moreover, it follows fromEq. 14 thatX(t) starts growing
at an exponential rate given by the parameter
c~p0NN X
:
By the time X tð Þ *v X , the exponential growth rate implied by Eq. 15 is
p~ p0Rzp
0
O
  R
X
=p0Rzp
0
O:
SinceN, X*? 1, and on general grounds p0Nwp0R , p0O , we conclude that c. p, i.e., the
growth of forummembers is much greater at the beginning than at the end of the time
span (0, t*).
Specification of the model without control. The model without control can be
simply written as
dX
dt
~pN N{X{R{Oð ÞX{ p0Rzp0O
 
R,
dR
dt
~p0RR,
dO
dt
~p0OR:
These equations show that the only mechanism the uncontrolled system has for
saturation is the reduction of susceptible individuals (N – X – R – O) over time.
However Table 3 and Figure 2 indicate that even when N is small and an adjustable
parameter, the controlled model fits the empirical data considerably better than the
uncontrolled model.
1. Newman, M. The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM review 45,
167–256 (2003).
2. Watts, D. The ‘‘new’’ science of networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 243–270
(2004).
3. Kleinberg, J. The convergence of social and technological networks.
Communications of the ACM 51, 66–72 (2008).
4. Lazer, D. et al. Social science: computational social science. Science 323, 721
(2009).
5. Baraba´si, A. The network takeover. Nature Physics 8, 14 (2011).
6. Bohorquez, J., Gourley, S., Dixon, A., Spagat, M. & Johnson, N. Common ecology
quantifies human insurgency. Nature 462, 911–914 (2009).
7. Clauset, A. & Gleditsch, K. The developmental dynamics of terrorist
organizations. PLoS ONE 7, e48633 (2009).
8. Johnson, N. et al. Pattern in Escalations in Insurgent and Terrorist Activity.
Science 333, 81 (2011).
9. Bohannon, J. Counting the Dead in Afghanistan. Science 331, 1256 (2011).
10. Hicks, M., Lee, U., Sundberg, R. & Spagat, M. Global Comparison of Warring
Groups in 2002–2007: Fatalities fromTargeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles. PloS
one 6, e23976 (2011).
11. Lim, M., Metzler, R. & Bar-Yam, Y. Global pattern formation and ethnic/cultural
violence. Science 317, 1540 (2007).
12. Nelson, G. Violence: the role of society and state. Nature 480, 181–181 (2011).
13. Hsiang, S., Meng, K. & Cane, M. Civil conflicts are associated with the global
climate. Nature 476, 438–441 (2011).
14. Rutherford, A., Harmon, D., Gard-Murray, A., Gros, A. & Bar-Yam, Y. Good
Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence.Available
at SSRN 1942515 (2011).
15. Atran, S. et al. Sacred barriers to conflict resolution. Science 317, 1039–1040
(2007).
16. Ginges, J., Atran, S., Medin, D. & Shikaki, K. Sacred bounds on rational resolution
of violent political conflict. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104,
7357 (2007).
17. Apic, G., Betts, M. & Russell, R. Content Disputes in Wikipedia Reflect
Geopolitical Instability. PloS one 6, e20902 (2011).
18. Morselli, C., Giguere, C. & Petit, K. The efficiency/security trade-off in criminal
networks. Social Networks 29, 143–153 (2007).
19. Lindelauf, R., Borm, P. & Hamers, H. The influence of secrecy on the
communication structure of covert networks. Social Networks 31, 126–137
(2009).
20. Sagarin, R. et al. Decentralize, adapt and cooperate. Nature 465, 292–293 (2010).
21. Weimann, G. Terror on the Internet: The new arena, the new challenges (United
States Institute of Peace, 2006).
22. Lia, B. Al-Qaeda online: understanding jihadist internet infrastructure. Janes
Intelligence Review 18, 14 (2006).
23. Efthymiopoulos, M. & Demergis, J. In Proceedings of 6th European Conference on
Information Warfare and Security (2007), 341.
24. Flade, F. Death of a online-jihadi: from cyberspace to battlefield. News Of
Terrorism, Jihadism & International Politics (December 2011).
25. Rogan, H. Jihadism Online: A study of how al-Qaida and radical Islamist groups
use the Internet for terrorist purposes. FFI/Report, Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment 915 (2006).
26. Brachman, J. & Levine, A. The World of Holy Warcraft. Foreign Policy (2011).
27. Allievi, S. Islam in the public space: social networks, media and neo-communities.
Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, 1–27
(2003).
28. Kohlmann, E. The Real Online Terrorist Threat. Foreign Affairs 85, 115 (2006).
29. Ali Musawi, M. Cheering for Osama: How jihadists use internet discussion
forums. New Quilliam Report (September 2010).
30. Brachman, J. High-tech terror: Al-Qaeda’s use of new technology. Fletcher Foreign
World Affairs 30, 149 (2006).
31.Middle East Media Research Institute (http://www.memri.org). Accessed 2012/2/1.
32. NEFA Foundation (http://www.nefafoundation.org). Accessed 2012/2/1.
33. SITE Intelligence Group (http://news.siteintelgroup.com). Accessed 2012/2/1.
34. Internet Haganah (http://internet-haganah.com). Accessed 2012/2/1.
35. ICT’s JihadiWebsites Monitoring Group (http://www.ict.org.il). Accessed 2012/2/1.
36. Jihad Watch (http://www.jihadwatch.org/). Accessed 2012/2/1.
37. Jordan, J., Torres, M. & Horsburgh, N. The Intelligence Services’ Struggle Against
al-Qaeda Propaganda. International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 18, 31–49 (2004).
38. Conway, M. Terrorism and the Internet: New Media—New Threat?
Parliamentary Affairs 59, 283 (2006).
39. Hegghammer, T. Spy forum (http://www.jihadica.com/spy-forums/)Accessed
2012/2/1. (2010).
40. Nakashima, E. Dismantling of saudi-cia web site illustrates need for clearer
cyberwar policies. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805464.html. Accessed 2012/2/1.
Washington Post (2010).
41. Musick, J. Counterstrike: the untold story of America’s secret campaign against Al
Qaeda. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7, 180–182 (2012).
42. Torres, M. The Vulnerabilities of Online Terrorism. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 35, 263–277 (2012).
43. Abend, L. Who is waging cyberwar against the jihadi networks? Available at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2111293,00.html. Accessed
2012/12/1. Time (2012).
44. Katz, R. & Stephenson, W. Terrorist on the Internet. Available at: http://
theconnection.wbur.org/2005/06/08/terrorist-on-the-internet, Accessed 2012/
22/2. The Connection (2005).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 1544 | DOI: 10.1038/srep01544 7
45. Juzgado Central de Instruccio´n #3; Diligencias previas 126/201; Available at:
http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201108/20/espana/
20110820elpepunac_1_Pes_PDF.pdf. Accessed 2012/2/1. (2011).
46. Anderson, R.,May, R. &Anderson, B. Infectious diseases of humans: dynamics and
control (Wiley Online Library, 1992).
47. Diekmann, O. &Heesterbeek, J.Mathematical epidemiology of infectious diseases:
model building, analysis and interpretation (Wiley, 2000).
48. Rogan, H. Al-Qaedas onlinemedia strategies: FromAbuReuter to Irhabi 007. FFI/
Report, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 2729 (2007).
49. Homan, R. The ethics of covert methods. British Journal of Sociology 31, 46–59
(1980).
50. Herrera, C. Two arguments for covert methods in social research. The British
journal of sociology 50, 331–343 (1999).
51. Satter, R. Sarkozy: Jail those who browse terror websites. Available at: http://
news.yahoo.com/sarkozy-jail-those-browse-terror-websites-182328946.html.
Accessed 2012/12/1. Associated Press (2012).
52. Levine, D. Users guide to the PGAPack parallel genetic algorithm library.Argonne
National Laboratory 9700 (1996).
53. Iribarren, J. & Moro, E. Impact of human activity patterns on the dynamics of
information diffusion. Physical review letters 103, 38702 (2009).
54. Karsai, M. et al. Small but slow world: how network topology and burstiness slow
down spreading. Physical Review E 83, 025102 (2011).
55. Berger, J. #Unfolow. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/
20/unfollow. Accessed 2012/22/2. Foreign Policy (2013).
56. Wright, S. Government-run Online Discussion Fora: Moderation, Censorship
and the Shadow of Control. The British Journal of Politics & International
Relations 8, 550–568 (2006).
57. King, G., Pan, J. & Roberts, M. How Censorship in China Allows Government
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. Available at: http://
gking.harvard.edu/sites/scholar.iq.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf.
Accessed 2012/22/2. APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper (2012).
Acknowledgments
James H. Fowler acknowledges support from the James S. McDonnell Foundation grant
#220020177/SC. Manuel Cebrian acknowledges support from the National Science
Foundation under grant 0905645, from DARPA/Lockheed Martin Guard Dog Program
under PO 4100149822, and the Army Research Office under Grant W911NF-11-1-0363.
Manuel R. Torres was supported by The SpanishMinistry of Science and Technology for his
time in residence at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Author contributions
Manuel Cebrian, Manuel R. Torres, Ramon Huerta and James H. Fowler collected the data,
designed and performed the research as well as wrote the paper.
Additional information
Competing financial interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests.
License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this
license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
How to cite this article: Cebrian, M., Torres, M.R., Huerta, R. & Fowler, J.H. Violent
extremist group ecologies under stress. Sci. Rep. 3, 1544; DOI:10.1038/srep01544 (2013).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 1544 | DOI: 10.1038/srep01544 8
